Gila Sher interviewed by Chen Bo: -/- I. Academic Background and Earlier Research: 1. Sher’s early years. 2. Intellectual influence: Kant, Quine, and Tarski. 3. Origin and main Ideas of The Bounds of Logic. 4. Branching quantifiers and IF logic. 5. Preparation for the next step. -/- II. Foundational Holism and a Post-Quinean Model of Knowledge: 1. General characterization of foundational holism. 2. Circularity, infinite regress, and philosophical arguments. 3. Comparing foundational holism and foundherentism. 4. A post-Quinean model (...) of knowledge. 5. Intellect and figuring out. 6. Comparing foundational holism with Quine’s holism. 7. Evaluation of Quine’s Philosophy -/- III. Substantive Theory of Truth and Relevant Issues: 1. Outline of Sher’s substantive theory of truth. 2. Criticism of deflationism and treatment of the Liar. 3. Comparing Sher’s substantive theory of truth with Tarski’s theory of truth. -/- IV. A New Philosophy of Logic and Comparison with Other Theories: 1. Foundational account of logic. 2. Standard of logicality, set theory and logic. 3. Psychologism, Hanna’s and Maddy’s conceptions of logic. 4. Quine’s theses about the revisability of logic. -/- V. Epilogue. (shrink)

This book addresses two main topics—first, the morality of thought and, second, what’s involved in having a free mind. It connects these topics by arguing that to have a free mind, a person must be willing to follow his thoughts wherever they lead, and that this just isn’t possible if the person thinks that some thoughts are morally off limits. The book therefore defends the unpopular position that it is not morally wrong to have even the nastiest of attitudes, the (...) most biased of beliefs, or the vilest of fantasies. Even when some of what we think is ugly, there is beauty and value in our being able to think it. -/- . (shrink)

abstractThis paper addresses the relation between morality and private thought. It is widely agreed that government and society have no business trying to control our thoughts—that, as long as we d...

Me, You, Us addresses a range of issues in moral and political philosophy and moral psychology, but are unified by their starkly individualistic view of the moral subject. They challenge recent tendencies to conceptualize normative issues in terms of relationships, collectivities, and social meanings.

Blame is an unpopular and neglected notion: it goes against the grain of a therapeutically-oriented culture and has been far less discussed by philosophers than such related notions as responsibility and punishment. This book seeks to show that neither the opposition nor the neglect is justified. The book's most important conclusion is that blame is inseperable from morality itself - that any considerations that justify us in accepting a set of moral principles must also call for the condemnation of those (...) who violate the principles. Properly understood, blame and morality must stand or fall together. (shrink)

Many people, including many contemporary philosophers, believe that the state has no business trying to improve people's characters, elevating their tastes, or preventing them from living degraded lives. They believe that governments should remain absolutely neutral when it comes to the consideration of competing conceptions of the good. One fundamental aim of George Sher's book is to show that this view is indefensible. A second complementary aim is to articulate a conception of the good that is worthy of promotion (...) by the state. The first part of the book analyses attempts to ground the neutrality thesis in the value of autonomy, respect for autonomy, the dangers of a non-neutral state, and scepticism about the good. The second part defends an objective conception of the good which remains sensitive to some of the considerations that make subjectivism attractive. (shrink)

To be responsible for their acts, agents must both perform those acts voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. In Who Knew? George Sher seeks to rectify that imbalance. The book is divided in two halves, the first of which criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition, while the second seeks to develop a (...) more adequate alternative. It is often assumed that agents are responsible only for what they are aware of doing or bringing about--that their responsibility extends only as far as the searchlight of their consciousness. The book criticizes this "searchlight view" on two main grounds: first, that it is inconsistent with our attributions of responsibility to a broad range of agents who should but do not realize that they are acting wrongly or foolishly, and, second, that the view is not independently defensible. The book's positive view construes the crucial relation between an agent and his failure to recognize the wrongness or foolishness of what he is doing in causal terms: the agent is responsible when, and because, his failure to respond to his reasons for believing that he is acting wrongly or foolishly has its origins in the same constitutive psychology that generally does render him reason-responsive. (shrink)

The idea that we should simply live in the moment, and should not concern ourselves about the future or the past, has long been a staple of popular philosophy. In this paper, I first attempt to clarify the doctrine and then examine the case for accepting it. My conclusions are, first, that a number of its implications seem quite unpalatable; second, that the main advantages that living in the moment are said to yield are greatly overstated; and, third, that to (...) live by any version of the doctrine that was not highly watered down would be to sacrifice much of what gives meaning to our lives. (shrink)

Gila Sher approaches knowledge from the perspective of the basic human epistemic situation—the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it in its full complexity. What principles should guide them? Two fundamental principles of knowledge are epistemic friction and freedom. Knowledge must be substantially constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower in accessing the world (freedom) theoretical knowledge is impossible. This requires a grounding of all knowledge, (...) empirical and abstract, in both mind and world, but the fall of traditional foundationalism has led many to doubt the viability of this ‘classical’ project. Sher challenges this skepticism, charting a new foundational methodology, foundational holism, that differs from others in being holistic, world-oriented, and universal (i.e., applicable to all fields of knowledge). Using this methodology, Epistemic Friction develops an integrated theory of knowledge, truth, and logic. This includes (i) a dynamic model of knowledge, incorporating some of Quine’s revolutionary ideas while rejecting his narrow empiricism, (ii) a substantivist, non-traditional correspondence theory of truth, and (iii) an outline of a joint grounding of logic in mind and world. The model of knowledge subjects all disciplines to demanding norms of both veridicality and conceptualization. The correspondence theory is robust and universal yet not simplistic or naive, admitting diverse forms of correspondence. Logic’s grounding in the world brings it in line with other disciplines while preserving, and explaining, its strong formality, necessity, generality, and normativity. (shrink)

The Bounds of Logic presents a new philosophical theory of the scope and nature of logic based on critical analysis of the principles underlying modern Tarskian logic and inspired by mathematical and linguistic development. Extracting central philosophical ideas from Tarski’s early work in semantics, Sher questions whether these are fully realized by the standard first-order system. The answer lays the foundation for a new, broader conception of logic. By generally characterizing logical terms, Sher establishes a fundamental result in (...) semantics. Her development of the notion of logicality for quantifiers and her work on branching are of great importance for linguistics. Sher outlines the boundaries of the new logic and points out some of the philosophical ramifications of the new view of logic for such issues as the logicist thesis, ontological commitment, the role of mathematics in logic, and the metaphysical underpinning of logic. She proposes a constructive definition of logical terms, reexamines and extends the notion of branching quantification, and discusses various linguistic issues and applications. (shrink)

To understand logic is, first and foremost, to understand logical consequence. This Element provides an in-depth, accessible, up-to-date account of and philosophical insight into the semantic, model-theoretic conception of logical consequence, its Tarskian roots, and its ideas, grounding, and challenges. The topics discussed include: the passage from Tarski's definition of truth to his definition of logical consequence, the need for a non-proof-theoretic definition, the idea of a semantic definition, the adequacy conditions of preservation of truth, formality, and necessity, the nature, (...) structure, and totality of models, the logicality problem that threatens the definition of logical consequence, a general solution to the logicality, formality, and necessity problems/challenges, based on the isomorphism-invariance criterion of logicality, philosophical background and justification of the isomorphism-invariance criterion, and major criticisms of the semantic definition and the isomorphism-invariance criterion. (shrink)

In problem solving research insights into the relationship between monitoring and control in the transfer of complex skills remain impoverished. To address this, in four experiments participants solved two complex control tasks that were identical in structure but varied in presentation format. Participants learnt either to solve the second task, based on their original learning phase from the first task, or learnt to solve the second task, based on another participant’s learning phase. Experiment 1 showed that, under conditions in which (...) participants’ learning phase was experienced twice, performance deteriorated in the second task. In contrast, when the learning phases in the first and second tasks differed, performance improved in the second task. Experiment 2 introduced instructional manipulations that induced the same response patterns as Experiment 1. In Experiment 3 further manipulations were introduced that biased the way participants evaluated the learning phase in the second task. In Experiment 4, judgments of self-efficacy were shown to track control performance. The implications of these findings for theories of complex skill acquisition are discussed. (shrink)

Gallicanism is specifically related to the Catholic Church of France, and it is a set of ecclesiastical and political doctrines and practices which tried to limit the powers of the Papacy in France in general. In particular, it characterized the situation of the Catholic Church in France at certain periods. The emergence of Gallicanism as a specific idea came about in the 14th century and was first used as a term in 1810. Almost everything expressed by Gallicanism is a distinctive (...) development within the French Catholic Church. Gallicanism was mostly about the riches of the Catholic Church and administrative matters rather than a theological movement. These issues were mostly related to episcopal jurisdiction, appointments of bishops, church properties and revenues, and at the core of all these issues lay the sharing of church revenues. The French Crown began to acquire gains, especially regarding the property and financial income of the church with the weakening of the power of the Papacy. This new situation left the bishops between the popes and the kings, and prepared the ground for the development of Gallicanism in the country. However, Gallicanism did not come around as a separatist movement and did not lead to the separation of the Catholic Church of France from the Roman Catholic Church. Due to the conflicts of interests between the king, parliament and the clergy, Gallicanism could not develop into a monolithic thought or doctrine, it manifested itself in different perspectives. These manifestations have been treated as Episcopal, Parliamentary, and Royal Gallicanism in most academic studies. Each of these different Gallican ideas brought to the fore the institutions indicated in their naming and received support from them. However, all three versions of Gallicanism shared some common ideals. These are the common ideals of different Gallicanisms: the independence of the king of France in worldly affairs, the supremacy of an ecumenical council over the pope, and the restriction of the pope's intervention in the French Catholic Church. Royal Gallicanism aimed to gather the powers snatched away from the Papacy in the hands of the king. Parliamentary Gallicanism shared similar principles with Royal Gallicanism. (shrink)

Modernizmle birlikte Batı'nın değişen insan, dünya, evren ve Tanrı algısı, şüphesiz Batı ile sınırlı kalmamış, hemen hemen bütün dünyayı etkilemiştir. Maddeye şekil verme hünerini ileri derecede geliştiren ve bunu kullanarak dünyanın geri kalan önemli bir kısmını ya bizzat veya nüfuz alanı oluşturarak egemenliği altına alan ve dünya coğrafyasında önemli değişiklikler meydana getiren Batı'nın bu faaliyetleri, ondan etkilenen diğer kültürlerin kendi din, ahlak, gelenek ve adetlerinden şüphe etmesine sebep olmuştur. Batı'nın üzerimizdeki askeri faaliyetlerinin ve belki Batı'ya olan coğrafi yakınlığımızın, bu etkinin (...) bizde daha fazla hissedilmesinin kaynağı olduğu söylenebilir. Bu çerçevede, fikir dünyamızda son yüzyılda seyreden bir hareketlilikten ve buna bağlı olarak meydana gelen önemli değişikliklerden söz etmek mümkündür. Kendi kültür, ahlak, din, örf, adet, gelenek, kısacası medeniyet anlayışımızı, yeni paradigmaya uydurma gayreti, aydınlarımızın çoğunun seçtiği yol olmuştur. Bununla birlikte Batı'dan teknolojinin, teknolojiyi oluşturan bilginin ve bilgi yönteminin alınmasının şart olduğunu, ancak kadim kültürün korunması gerektiğini savunan aydınlarımız da az değildir. İşte bunlardan biri de son yüzyılda, kültürümüz ve kültürümüzü meydana getiren bilgi dallarıyla ilgili birçok eser kaleme almış olan Ömer Nasuhi Bilmen'dir. Bir toplumu, diğerlerinden ayıran en önemli faktörlerden biri de etik kurallar konusundaki tercihlerdir. Bilmen, belki de bunu fark ettiği için, etik konusuna çok fazla önem vermiş, bu konudaki değişime karşı çıkmış ve kadim ahlak sisteminin korunması gerektiğini var gücüyle savunmuştur. Bu kitap ise, Bilmen'in bu konudaki düşüncelerini ele almakta ve irdelemektedir. (shrink)

Islamic argument about the Parda system among Indian Muslims (to protect women from the view of men).

'O men, serve your Lord who created you and those before you, so that you may guard against evil. Deals with Allah, Prophet Muhammad PBUH, Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Sahib -- What are the signs of the appearance of the promised messiah? and do these signs appear in the being of Hazrat Mirza Sahib?

In this article the authors would like to present a history of the Turkish feminist movement. The roots of the feminist movement go back to the last decades of Ottoman Empire in Turkey when westernisation had started to take place. During the firts decade of the Republic many steps were taken to enable women to get involved in public, political and professional life and to encourage more equality in family matters. Women’s emancipation became a significant symbol of modernity. Kemalist reforms (...) attemted to create a new woman who could take place in public sphere with the men. During the 1970’s the movement of women almost disappeared in nationalist and socialist movements. After the military intervention in 1980 new female actors started to present new demands and change the nature of feminist movement in Turkey. (shrink)

La Révolte de l'Universel se propose d'explorer d'autres axes pour une mondialisation débarrassée de la toute-puissance de ceux qui prétendent détenir le pouvoir au grand mépris de l'intérêt des peuples. Il y est question de l'expérience de la pensée comme le signifiant primordial et prioritaire de l'agir responsable. La Révolte de l'universel signifie se redonner le temps et la disponibilité pour le loisir de la pensée, de la création. Elle entend se concevoir comme une éthique de la vérité, de la (...) liberté et de la responsabilité. A travers elle, l'ouvrage explore et expose un autre visage de la mondialisation. (shrink)

Many philosophers are baffled by necessity. Humeans, in particular, are deeply disturbed by the idea of necessary laws of nature. In this paper I offer a systematic yet down to earth explanation of necessity and laws in terms of invariance. The type of invariance I employ for this purpose generalizes an invariance used in meta-logic. The main idea is that properties and relations in general have certain degrees of invariance, and some properties/relations have a stronger degree of invariance than others. (...) The degrees of invariance of highly-invariant properties are associated with high degrees of necessity of laws governing/describing these properties, and this explains the necessity of such laws both in logic and in science. This non-mysterious explanation has rich ramifications for both fields, including the formality of logic and mathematics, the apparent conflict between the contingency of science and the necessity of its laws, the difference between logical-mathematical, physical, and biological laws/principles, the abstract character of laws, the applicability of logic and mathematics to science, scientific realism, and logical-mathematical realism. (shrink)

In Coercion and Responsibility in Islam, Mairaj Syed explores how classical Muslim theologians and jurists from four intellectual traditions argue about the thorny issues that coercion raises about responsibility for one's action. This is done by assessing four ethical problems: whether the absence of coercion or compulsion is a condition for moral agency; how the law ought to define what is coercive; coercion's effect on the legal validity of speech acts; and its effects on moral and legal responsibility in (...) the cases of rape and murder.Through a comparative and historical examination of these ethical problems, the book demonstrates the usefulness of a new model for analyzing ethical thought produced by intellectuals working within traditions in a competitive pluralistic environment. The book compares classical Muslim thought on coercion with that of modern Western thinkers on these issues and finds significant parallels between them. The finding suggests that a fruitful starting point for comparative ethical inquiry, especially inquiry aimed at the discovery of common ground for ethical action, may be found in an examination of how ethicists from different traditions considered concrete problems. (shrink)

Despite the fact that Islam is one of the major religions, the frameworks of this faith are yet to be fully understood. As a consequence, it is being confused with activities contrary to its teachings. Islam has an elaborate treatment for almost every aspect of life including the affairs of business. Business is an acceptable and dignified occupation, which has to be conducted within the given frameworks. Islam encourages the creation, acquisition and consumption of wealth, and the fulfilling of certain (...) conditions in so doing. Wealth is held in trust as a gift from God. The terms of reference of this trust are to be complied with. Ethical principles do play a major role in shaping the behavior of a Muslim, in or out of business. In an era of globalization, the need for a better understanding of the premises of Islamic faith cannot be overemphasized. (shrink)

"--Jeffrie Murphy, The Philosophical Review (forthcoming).

Abstract:One view of practical reasoning is that it involves the weighing of reasons. It is not clear, however, how the weights of reasons combine, especially given the logical and substantive relations among different reasons. Nor is it clear how the weighing of reasons relates to decision theoretic maximization of expected value. This paper constructs a formal model of reasons and their weight in order to shed light on these issues. The model informs philosophical debates about reasons, such as the question (...) of whether reasons or values are more fundamental and the opposing doctrines of atomism and holism about reasons. (shrink)

An important technique in large cardinal set theory is that of extending an elementary embedding j: M → N between inner models to an elementary embedding j*: M[G] → N[G*] between generic extensions of them. This technique is crucial both in the study of large cardinal preservation and of internal consistency. In easy cases, such as when forcing to make the GCH hold while preserving a measurable cardinal (via a reverse Easton iteration of α-Cohen forcing for successor cardinals α), the (...) generic G* is simply generated by the image of G. But in difficult cases, such as in Woodin's proof that a hypermeasurable is sufficient to obtain a failure of the GCH at a measurable, a preliminary version of G* must be constructed (possibly in a further generic extension of M[G]) and then modified to provide the required G*. In this article we use perfect trees to reduce some difficult cases to easy ones, using fusion as a substitute for distributivity. We apply our technique to provide a new proof of Woodin's theorem as well as the new result that global domination at inaccessibles (the statement that d (κ) is less than 2κ for inaccessible κ, where d (κ) is the dominating number at κ) is internally consistent, given the existence of 0#. (shrink)

My aim in this essay is to explore the implications of the fact that even our most deeply held moral beliefs have been profoundly affected by our upbringing and experience—that if any of us had had a sufficiently different upbringing and set of experiences, he almost certainly would now have a very different set of moral beliefs and very different habits of moral judgment. This fact, together with the associated proliferation of incompatible moral doctrines, is sometimes invoked in support of (...) liberal policies of toleration and restraint, but the relevance of these considerations to individual moral deliberation has received less attention. In Sections II through V, I shall argue that this combination of contingency and controversy poses a serious challenge to the authority of our moral judgments. In Section VI, I shall explore a promising way of responding to this challenge. (shrink)

Given the privileged status claimed for active learning in a variety of domains (visuo-motor learning, causal induction, problem solving, education, skill learning), the present study examines whether action-based learning is a necessary, or a sufficient, means of acquiring the relevant skills needed to perform a task typically described as requiring active learning. To achieve this, the present study compared the effects of action-based and observation-based learning on controlling a complex dynamic task environment. Both action- and observationbased learners either learnt by (...) describing the changes in the environment in the form of a conditional statement, or not. The findings show that observational learners are sensitive to the instructional manipulations pursued during learning, in ways that are comparable to the active learning conditions. For both, advantages in performance, accuracy in knowledge of the task, and self-insight were found when learning was based on inducing rules from the task environment. (shrink)

This book offers a new and compelling account of distributive justice and its relation to choice. Unlike luck egalitarians, who treat unchosen differences in people's circumstances as sources of unjust inequality to be overcome, Sher views such differences as pervasive and unavoidable features of the human situation. Appealing to an original account of what makes us moral equals, he argues that our interest in successfully negotiating life's ever-shifting contingencies is more basic than our interest in achieving any more specific (...) goals. He argues, also, that the state's obligation to promote this interest supports a principled version of the view that what matters about resources, opportunity, and other secondary goods is only that each person have enough. The book opens up a variety of new questions, and offers a distinctive new perspective for scholars of political theory and political philosophy, and for those interested in distributive justice and luck egalitarianism. (shrink)

The forcing method is a powerful tool to prove the consistency of set-theoretic assertions relative to the consistency of the axioms of set theory. Laver’s theorem and Bukovský’s theorem assert that set-generic extensions of a given ground model constitute a quite reasonable and sufficiently general class of standard models of set-theory.In Sects. 2 and 3 of this note, we give a proof of Bukovsky’s theorem in a modern setting ). In Sect. 4 we check that the multiverse of set-generic extensions (...) can be treated as a collection of countable transitive models in a conservative extension of ZFC. The last section then deals with the problem of the existence of infinitely-many independent buttons, which arose in the modal-theoretic approach to the set-generic multiverse by Hamkins and Loewe :1793–1817, 2008). (shrink)